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Abstract
We study an optimal timing decision problem where an agent endowed with a risky invest-
ment opportunity trades the benets of waiting for additional information against a potential
loss in rst-mover advantage. The players clocks are de-synchronized in that they learn of
the investment opportunity at di¤erent times. Previous literature has uncovered an inverted-U
shaped relationship between a players equilibrium expected expenditures and the measure of his
competitors. This result no longer holds when the increase in the measure of players leads to a
decrease in the degree of clock synchronization in the game. We show that the result reemerges
if information arrives only at discrete times, and thus, a players strategic beliefs are updated
between decision times in a measurably meaningful way.
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1 Introduction
In a variety of situations that are modelled as preemption games, economic agents are heterogenous
with respect to the times when they learn of an investment opportunity. For instance, some rms
may become aware of a change in consumer demand earlier than others, R&D departments may
make a technological breakthrough that allows them to start developing a new product at di¤erent
times, and stock traders may learn of the possible existence of a nancial bubble sequentially. Brun-
nermeier and Morgan (2010) refer to these types of situations as clock games with de-synchronized
clocks. More precisely, a clock game has a set of players who, sequentially, receive a signal informing
them of the opportunity to take a particular action. A players clock starts at the instant when he
receives his signal. The time interval over which all clocks start is called the awareness window,
and an increase in its length corresponds to a decrease in the degree of clock synchronization in the
game. Brunnermeier and Morgan (2010) study clock games with a xed number of players and a
varying degree of clock synchronization.
In many real-world examples of clock games, if the action yields a risky prospect, players have
the option to wait and acquire additional payo¤-relevant information before taking it.1 In this case,
the clock de-synchronization induces heterogeneity among players with respect to the amount of
information that they possess at any given time. Barbos (2012) studies clock games with risky
prospects and unobservable moves, and examines the strategic e¤ect of a change in n, the measure
of players in the game, when the degree of clock synchronization in the game is xed. The resulting
model is applied to investigate the relationship between competition and innovation. In many real-
world situations, though, the decrease in the degree of clock synchronization is generated precisely
by the increase in n, as it may take more time for a larger set of players to learn of an investment
opportunity. In this paper, we consider a clock game with risky prospects, and investigate the
strategic e¤ect of an increase in n that decreases the degree of clock synchronization.
The players in our model decide on the time when to undertake a project by trading the
benets of waiting for additional information about its feasibility against a potential loss in rst-
mover advantage: a players ex-post payo¤ from a feasible project is decreasing in the measure of
competitors who moved before him. This results in an optimal timing decision problem in which
a player compares the marginal cost of waiting for additional information (the expected loss in
rst-mover advantage) with its marginal benet (the value of information), and invests as soon as
the former exceeds the latter. Players are subjected to a non-negativity constraint on the expected
ex-ante payo¤ that accounts for the risk and cost of investment. Barbos (2012) shows that in
these games, an increase in n that does not alter the degree of clock synchronization, leads to an
inverted-U relationship between a players expected expenditures and the measure of players.
1For instance, a rm may acquire information about the likely protability of the investment before undertaking
it, an R&D department may perform additional tests to examine the technological feasibility of the invention before
developing it into a new product, and a stock trader may examine in more detail the underlying economic activity
on which the nancial bubble may have been generated before altering his trading position.
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The key driving force behind this result is the adverse e¤ect of an increase in n on a players
expected ex-post payo¤, and therefore on his marginal cost of waiting. When n is small, an increase
in this measure induces then a player to undertake a riskier project by investing earlier. When n
is high, and the non-negativity constraint on the expected ex-ante payo¤ binds, a player adjusts
to a further increase in the measure of his competitors by investing with a decreasing probability
while holding the risk level constant. In equilibrium, this increases the expected ex-post payo¤s by
reducing the measure of players who invest, and allows for non-negative ex-ante payo¤s. From the
viewpoint of the time a players clock starts, an increase in n therefore leads to an increase in a
players expected expenditures when n is small, and to a decrease when n is su¢ ciently high.
This relationship no longer holds if the increase in n results in a decrease in the degree of clock
synchronization in the game that preserves the density of clock starting times in the awareness
window. In this case, a higher n does not increase a players marginal cost of waiting by means of
decreasing his expected ex-post payo¤, but by increasing his belief about the event that investment
is ongoing in the game at a given time. While this belief is increasing in n, it is inelastic with
respect to it in a neighborhood of the equilibrium waiting time. In particular, a player knows for
sure that, at the equilibrium waiting time, investment is ongoing in the game. Therefore, as the
interval between decision times shrinks, in the limit, the marginal cost is perfectly inelastic with
respect to n at the equilibrium waiting time. Since the optimal waiting time is determined by the
equality between the marginal cost and the marginal benet of waiting, the optimality condition
is satised for the same waiting time irrespective of the value of n. Therefore, a player does not
invest earlier in a project when the measure of his competitors increases.
In this paper we show that the result reemerges if the information about the feasibility of the
project arrives only at discrete times.2 For instance, macroeconomic data is released at various
regular intervals, information about a rms nancial status comes quarterly, test results for new
drugs are obtained at discrete times, etc. In these cases a players strategic beliefs are updated
in a measurably meaningful way between decision times, and thus the marginal cost of waiting is
nowhere perfectly inelastic. Instead, it is increasing in n at all possible waiting times, and therefore,
for low values of n, an increase in n induces a player to undertake the project earlier. For values of
n for which the non-negativity constraint on the expected ex-ante payo¤ binds, a player reacts to
a further increase in n by investing with a decreasing probability and by waiting longer.
Clock games were introduced in the literature by Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003) to study
the persistence of mispricing in nancial markets.3 Brunnermeier and Morgan (2010) construct a
nite agent analog of their model and test in an experimental setting some of its key predictions
that relate the degree of clock de-synchronization in the game with the equilibrium delay. In these
models, the payo¤ structure exhibits a mixture of preemption games and wars of attrition: the
2Our model is strategically isomorphic to one in which information arrives continuously but players are restricted
to take actions at discrete times. Thus, our results extend also to situations captured by these types of models.
3See also Doblas-Madrid (2012) who consider a discrete time version of the Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002) model
and assumes endogenous pricing and no behavioral types.
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payo¤s are increasing deterministically as a function of time up to the kth player to move, and fall
to a random value immediately after.4 This payo¤ structure is designed so as to mimic a nancial
bubble where traders who ride it enjoy its benets as long as there are still enough agents in the
market, but incur a loss when a crash occurs once su¢ ciently many of them exited.5
The ex-post payo¤s in our model are decreasing in the measure of players who have moved by a
given time, as in pure preemption games, but players have an incentive to wait that is determined by
the value of information that they can acquire. This relates out paper to the literature on timing
of irreversible actions under uncertainty. Jensen (1982), Chamley and Gale (1994) or Decamps
and Mariotti (2004) study models of endogenous or exogenous information acquisition in which the
incentive to invest early is provided by the discounting of future payo¤s rather than the competitive
pressure. On the other hand, preemption games have been extensively studied in the literature,
starting with the seminal papers of Reinganum (1981) and Fundenber and Tirole (1985). While the
model is distinct, Weeds (2002), who also studies preemption games where the incentive to delay
investment is provided by the opportunity to learn new information, is the closest paper to ours
from this literature.6 Finally, another related stream of research is the experimentation literature
(see, for instance, Bolton and Harris (1999) or Cripps, Keller and Rady (2005)) that studies the
trade-o¤ between current output and information that can help increase output in the future.
2 The Model
There is a continuum set of identical and risk-neutral players who, sequentially, learn of an invest-
ment opportunity in a risky project. A mass a of players learn of the opportunity at each instant
t 2 [t0; t0+], with  > 0. Players do not know t0 but have a prior distribution on it that is uniform
on R.7 The moment when player i learns of the opportunity, i.e., when his clock starts, is denoted
by ti. Since players become aware of the project at di¤erent times, their clocks are de-synchronized.
Once player is clock starts, he may invest at any time ti + t, with t  0. There is a one-time xed
cost c of investing. A player does not observe his opponentsactions.8
At ti, player i has belief p0 that the project is feasible. Delaying action allows learning at no
cost additional information about its feasibility. As in Barbos (2012), we consider that an infeasible
project generates a negative signal with a Poisson rate , but here we assume that player i can
observe such a signal only at times ti+t, with t 2 Z+  f; 2; 3; :::g, and  2
 
0; 2

. If the project
4Sahuguet (2006) and Park and Smith (2008) are other papers with non-nomonotonic payo¤ structures.
5Another paper that examines clock games in an experimental setting is Camerer, Kang and Ray (2010).
6Hoppe (2000), Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003), and Argenziano and Schmidt-Dengler (2012) are also related.
7The continuum set of players can be interpreted simply as the distribution of the unknown locations on the
timeline of a nite number of players. The nonstandard distribution of t0 is used to avoid boundary e¤ects. An
alternative is to discard the common prior assumption, and instead of having player is posterior belief about t0 at ti
be derived from a common prior about t0, to consider this belief to be the players prior about t0 at that time.
8As Park and Smith (2008) argue silent timing games capture economic applications where timing decisions
must be made well ahead of the time the action begins, as with high-tech market entry decisions or R&D investments.
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is feasible, no negative signal is generated. Therefore, once a player receives a negative signal, he
learns that the project is infeasible. On the other hand, as time passes, absent a negative signal,
his belief that the project is feasible is updated favorably and the risk of investment is reduced.
The signals are private information to each player.
Player is ex-post payo¤ from investing at time ti + t in a feasible project is
(m;m(tjti; t0)) = A(m)  m(tjti; t0); for some  2 R+, and A : R+ ! R+ with A0 () < 0: (1)
where m is the total measure of players that invest in the project and m(tjti; t0) is the measure of
players that invest before player i. The specication of  captures a congestion e¤ect and a rst-
mover advantage.9 The ex-post payo¤ from investing in an infeasible project is zero.10 To isolate
the e¤ect of competitive pressure in inducing players to invest early, we assume no intertemporal
discounting. The payo¤ of a player who does not invest is normalized at zero.
Note that the measure of players in the game is n = a; thus, higher values of either a or
 increase n. A higher a holds constant the degree of clock synchronization. A higher  lowers
the degree of clock synchronization, but holds constant the density of clock starting times in the
awareness window, [t0; t0 + ]. Our focus in this paper is on the strategic e¤ect of an increase in .
To simplify exposition, we make the following assumption that ensures an interior solution.
Assumption 1 We assume  2 (m; M ), where m solves (am; am)   c = 0, and M solves
p0a

   22M

= c (1  p0)
 
1  e .
The upper bound ensures that players do acquire some information before investing. The lower
bound ensures that they do not do so indenitely.
3 Results
In section 3.1 we introduce concepts that are used in the formal analysis of the game. In section
3.2 we present the equilibrium of the game for a xed value of , while in section 3.3 we present
9The quasilinear functional form of  allows for a more transparent intuition of the results and a clearer exposition.
With this specication, the marginal cost of waiting for one more period is essentially the expected measure of players
who invest in that period, rather than the corresponding e¤ect on the expected payo¤. As in Barbos (2012), the
salient results of the paper extend to more general functional forms for .
10The model can be represented as a Bayesian game in normal-form as follows. The type of a player i is the time ti
when his clock starts. The set of possible sets of types of the players is f[t0; t0 + ] : t0 2 [ti   ; ti]g. A type prole,
denoted by T (t0), is a uniform probability density function over a set of the form [t0; t0 + ]. The set of possible type
proles is thus T  fT (t0) : T (t0)  Uniform ([t0; t0 + ]) for some t0 2 [ti   ; ti]g. A players belief i(T (t0)jti) is
determined by the posterior belief about t0 as follows: i(T (t0)jti) = 1 , if t0 2 [ti   ; ti] and 0 otherwise. In other
words, player i believes that the opponents are distributed uniformly on [t0; t0 + ], where t0 is distributed uniformly
on [ti   ; ti]. The action space of player i is the set of possible waiting times R+ [ f1g, where f1g represents the
option to not invest in the project.
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the main result of the paper that elicits the e¤ect of an increase in  on the equilibrium strategies.
In section 3.4 we discuss the results and provide the intuition for the contrast between the results
obtained when information arrives continuously and when it arrives discretely.
3.1 Preliminaries
Note that it is never a best response for player i to invest at times ti + t, with t =2 Z+. In fact, the
model is strategically isomorphic to one in which players observe the negative signals continuously,
but can only take decisions in discrete time. Therefore, we restrict attention throughout to decision
times ti + t, with t 2 Z+. A strategy is then a probability distribution function s() over the set
of waiting times Z+ [ f1g. For t 2 Z+, st is the probability that player i invests at time ti + t,
conditional on no negative signal having been received up to or at that time. With a slight abuse
of notation, s1 denotes the probability that the player does not invest even if a negative signal is
never received.
We dene a simple strategy to be one that assigns strictly positive probability to at most two
nite waiting times.
Denition 2 A simple strategy with waiting time  is a probability distribution s() over Z+[f1g
such that: (i) s > 0, (ii) s+  0, (iii) st = 0 for all t 2 Z+nf ;  + g.
In the rest of the paper, we use hs ; s+i to denote a generic simple strategy when s+  0,
and use hs i to denote a simple strategy for the particular case when s+ = 0. We will focus on
symmetric equilibria in simple strategies. Besides their relative intuitive appeal determined by the
lower degree of complexity than that typically associated with strategies that involve randomization
over multiple pure strategies, this class of strategies is also the smallest with the property that it
contains a unique symmetric equilibrium for values of  in (m; M ) except a countable subset.
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We will refer throughout to values computed as of moment ti for player i as the ex-ante values.
The formal analysis of the game is based on the comparison, for an arbitrary player i, of the ex-ante
marginal cost and marginal benet of waiting at ti+ t for one more period , while keeping track of
the option value of waiting. The ex-ante marginal cost (MC) of waiting at ti + t is the decrease in
the expected payo¤ due to the increase in the expected measure of players that invest between ti+t
and ti+ t+. The ex-ante marginal benet (MB) of waiting at ti+ t is the value of the information
acquired between the same times. Next, we provide precise denitions for the two concepts.
Denote by F the event that the project is feasible, by Nt the event that a negative signal is
received by player i before ti + t, and by F c and N ct their complements. The Poisson generating
11Symmetric equilibria in other strategies cannot be excluded. As Barbos (2012) argues, the intuition behind the
salient results of the paper would be preserved in these alternative equilibria.
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process implies that, conditional on F c, the delay of arrival of a negative signal has an exponential
distribution with parameter . Therefore, for t 2 Z+, we have Pr (NtjF c) = 1  e t.
The MB of waiting at ti + t, computed as of moment ti, is the expected value of the forgone
costs on an infeasible project generated by the additional information, i.e.,
MB(t)  c  Pr(Nt+ \N ct jF c)  Pr(F c) = c (1  p0)
h
1  e 
i
e t (2)
The equality in (2) follows because Nt  Nt+ implies Pr(Nt+ \ N ct jF c) = Pr(Nt+nNtjF c) =
Pr(Nt+jF c)  Pr(NtjF c) = e t   e (t+).
Next, we dene formally the MC of waiting under a strategy prole in which all players adopt
a simple strategy hs i. Note rst that for a given value of t0, if all players adopt hs i, the rst
player invests at t0 +  , while the last invests at t0 +  + . Therefore, conditional on t0, from the
perspective of player i, the measure of players who have already invested by time ti + t is
mhs i(tjti; t0) =
8><>:
0, when ti + t < t0 + 
sa [(ti + t)  (t0 + )] , when ti + t 2 [t0 +  ; t0 +  + ]
sa, when ti + t > t0 +  + 
(3)
The uniform prior distribution on t0 implies that, at ti, player is posterior of t0 is uniform on
[ti   ; ti]. Thus, the expected measure of players who have invested by time ti + t is
hs i(tjti)  Et0

mhs i(tjti; t0)

=
1

Z ti
ti 
mhs i(tjti; t0)dt0 (4)
Then, conditional on F , player is expected ex-post payo¤ from investing at ti + t is
Et0


 
sa;mhs i(tjti; t0)

= A (sa)  hs i(tjti) (5)
Firm is ex-ante MC of waiting at ti + t is then the unconditional expected di¤erence between the
expected payo¤ from investing at ti + t, and the expected payo¤ from investing at ti + t+ 
MChs i(t)  ap0

hs i(t+ jti)  hs i(tjti)

(6)
Denote by
hs i (t) 
(
1


    +  t+ 2 , for t 2 (max (0;    ) ; )
1


    t+ 2+  , for t 2 [ ;  + ) (7)
The following lemma elicits the MC of waiting for one more period . Its proof is in appendix A.12
Lemma 3 Under a symmetric strategy prole hs i, MChs i(t) = p0ashs i (t) for t 2 Z+ \
12MChs i(t) is zero for t 2 Z+n (max (0;    ) ;  + ) since under the symmetric strategy prole hs i, no player
is supposed to invest before ti + max (0;    ) or after ti +  + .
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(max (0;    ) ;  + ).
To understand the lemma, consider rst some t 2 [max (0;    ) ;  ]\Z+. As explained above,
under a strategy prole hs i, from player is viewpoint, investment has started in the game by time
ti + t if and only if ti + t  t0 +  , that is, t0  ti   (   t). Also, with probability one, investment
has not yet ended by ti + t since t <  . Given that t0  ti   , it follows that player is belief
that investment is ongoing in the game at ti + t is Pr (t0 2 [ti   ; ti   (   t))) = 1 [    + t].
Similarly, for t 2 [ ;  + ], investing has started for sure in the game, but it has not yet ended if
and only if ti + t  t0 +  + , i.e., for t0 2 [ti    + (t   ); ti). Therefore, player is belief that
investment is ongoing at ti + t is Pr (t0 2 [ti    + (t  ); ti)) = 1 [   t+  ]. hs i (t), as dened
by (7), is then just the "average" belief that investment is ongoing in the game at the times in
[t; t+ ].
On the other hand, from (3) and (4), by some straightforward calculations, we have that
1
as
@
@t
hs i(tjti) =
(
1

R ti ( t)
ti  dt0 =
1
 [    + t] , for t 2 [max (0;    ) ;  ]
1

R ti
ti +(t ) dt0 =
1
 [   t+  ] , for t 2 [ ;  + ]
(8)
Therefore, 1as
@
@ths i(tjti) equals precisely the measure of the set of values of t0 for which investment
is ongoing at ti + t. Thus, waiting for an additional innitesimal amount of time t, increases
hs i(tjti) by as t times the probability that investment is ongoing in the game at ti+ t. Lemma
3 states that the ex-ante MC of waiting for a period  is p0as   multiplied by hs i (t), i.e., by
the average belief over [t; t+ ] that investment is ongoing in the game.
The above argument underscores the key distinction between increases in n by means of increases
in a or . Note that since hs i (t) is increasing in ,MChs i(t) is strictly increasing in both a and ,
for all t 2 [max (0;    ) ;  + ]. However, the two parameters increase the MC through distinct
channels. A higher a increases the potential loss in ex-post payo¤ from being beaten to the punch
by another player, conditional on the fact that investment is ongoing in the game at the time the
player invests. On the other hand, a higher  increases the (average) belief that a player has on
[t; t+ ] regarding the event that other players are investing. In other words, while the increase in
a decreases the ex-ante expected payo¤ of a player by means of decreasing the ex-post payo¤s, an
increase in  decreases it by means of altering a players strategic beliefs. This distinction lies at
the core of the results in this paper.13
Next, we dene formally and compute the ex-ante MC of waiting under a symmetric strategy
prole hs ; s+i. Note that in this case, the expected measure of players who have invested by
13This also underlies the role that the uncertainty about t0 plays in the model. If t0 is common knowledge, in a
symmetric equilibrium, the MC of waiting does not increase when  increases. The MC would be either p0as or
zero depending on whether investment is ongoing or not. As we will see, this would imply, for instance, that players
do not respond by investing earlier for low values of .
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time ti + t, from the perspective of player i, is
hs ;s+i(tjti) = hs i(tjti) + hs+i(tjti) (9)
Essentially, one can think of the mass a of players whose clocks start at any time ti as being split
into a mass that adopts strategy hs i, and a mass that adopts strategy hs+i; thus, (9) follows
immediately. Then, the MC of waiting at ti + t, with t 2 Z+ \ (max (0;    ) ;  + ) is
MChs ;s+i(t)  ap0

hs ;s+i(t+ jti)  hs ;s+i(tjti)

(10)
= MChs i(t) +MChs+i(t)
= p0a

shs i (t) + s+hs+i (t)

where the rst equality follows from (6) and (9), and the second from lemma 3.
The last result of the section elicits the ex-ante expected investment expenditures of a player
who adopts a simple strategy hs ; s+i. We denote this amount by Ihs ;s+i. Note that the ex-
ante unconditional probability of investment of a player who adopts hs i is the probability that a
negative signal is not received by time  , i.e., Pr (N ct ) = p0+(1  p0) e  . The proof of the lemma
follows then immediately from the fact that Ihs ;s+i = cPr (N c ) s + cPr
 
N c+

s+.
Lemma 4 Ihs ;s+i = c [p0 + (1  p0) e  ] s + c

p0 + (1  p0) e (+)

s+
3.2 The Equilibrium for a Fixed Value of 
The next proposition identies the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a symmetric equilibrium
in which players adopt strategy hs i to exist for a xed value of . Its proof is in appendix B1. The
equilibrium notion we employ throughout is the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
Proposition 5 A symmetric equilibrium strategy hs i exists if and only if
p0

sa;
1
2
sa

  c p0 + (1  p0) e    0, ( = 0, if s < 1) (11)
MChs i(   ) MB (   ) (12)
MB () MChs i() (13)
 (sa; sa)  c  0, for s 2 (0; 1) (14)
To understand condition (11), note rst that in the symmetric equilibrium under consideration,
player is expected ex-post payo¤ from a feasible project is 
 
as;
1
2as

. This is because the
expected measure of players whose clocks started before that of player i is precisely 12a, and all
players wait the same time. Second, Pr (N c ) = [p0 + (1  p0) e  ] is the equilibrium unconditional
probability that the investment is made, so cPr (N ct ) is the expected ex-ante investment cost.
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Therefore, condition (11) states that the expected ex-ante payo¤ from following the equilibrium
strategy is non-negative. Conditions (12) and (13) state that it is enough for player i to have an
incentive to wait at ti +    , and an incentive to not wait at ti +  , in order to not have an
incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy of investing precisely at ti +  . Condition (14) is
necessary because otherwise players would wait until all uncertainty about the project is removed.
The formal proof of proposition 5 from the appendix explores the properties of a player is
expected ex-ante payo¤ from investing at ti + t for all t 2 Z+. Essentially, though, the proof
amounts to showing a virtual single crossing property between the MC and MB curves. The MB
curve is above the MC curve for t <  , and below for values of t immediately above  .14 While
the two curves may intersect again for some higher value t >  , the shape of the ex-ante expected
payo¤ as a function of the waiting time t and condition (14) imply that the player does not nd
it protable to wait more than  time units. Therefore, players postpone investing as long as the
MB of waiting exceeds the MC, and invest as soon as the MC exceeds the MB.
Denition 6 We say that a property holds for almost any  2 (m; M ) if it holds for all  2
(m; M ) except a countable subset.
The next corollary states the uniqueness of the equilibrium strategy hs i except for a countable
subset where some knife-edge conditions are satised. Its proof is in appendix B2.
Corollary 7 For almost any  2 (m; M ), there is at most one strategy hs i satisfying (11)-(14).
The next proposition, whose proof is in appendix B3, describes a symmetric equilibrium in
which players adopt simple strategy hs ; s+i, with s+ > 0.
Proposition 8 A symmetric equilibrium strategy hs ; s+i, with s+ > 0, exists if and only if
p0
 
(s + s+) a; hs ;s+i( jti)
  c p0 + (1  p0) e    0, ( = 0, if s + s+ < 1) (15)
MChs ;s+i() = MB () (16)
 ((s + s+) a; (s + s+) a)  c  0, for s + s+ < 1 (17)
As in the case of proposition 5, it is necessary that players expect non-negative ex-ante payo¤s,
and that waiting until all uncertainty is removed is not protable. Condition (16) requires that
players are indi¤erent between waiting  or  +  time units. The shape of the expected ex-ante
payo¤ as a function of the waiting time implies that these are su¢ cient for it to be maximized
at waiting times  and  + . The next corollary, whose proof is in appendix B4, states some
uniqueness properties of strategies hs ; s+i satisfying the conditions in proposition 8. Note that
14Note that the MB is decreasing in t, while the MC is increasing for t <  and decreasing for t >  .
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part (i) only claims the uniqueness of hs ; s+i for a xed value of  . Corollary 14 will state the
uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium in simple strategies for any  and almost any .
Corollary 9 (i) For almost any  2 (m; M ) and any  2 Z+, there exist at most on pair of
values (s ; s+) satisfying (15)-(17). (ii) For almost any  2 (m; M ), there exists no strategy
hs ; s+i, with s + s+ = 1, satisfying (15)-(17).
3.3 The Strategic E¤ect of a Change in the Measure of Players
The main result of the paper elicits the equilibrium strategies and expected ex-ante investment
expenditures as the measure of players in the game varies. To illustrate the role of the discreteness
of the information arrival, we present rst the equilibrium of the game in which information arrives
continuously.
The rst proposition considers the case when n increases by means of an increase in a. hsa i
denotes a simple strategy in the game corresponding to a given value of a. a, sa and Ia are the
respective waiting time, probability of investment, and expected investment expenditures. The
proposition, whose proof is in Barbos (2012), uncovers the inverted-U shaped relationship between
the measure of players in the game and a players equilibrium ex-ante investment expenditures.
Proposition 10 Assume information arrives continuously. Then, there exists a unique symmetric
equilibrium simple strategy hsa i, and a threshold ba, such that: (i) for a < ba, ddaa < 0, sa = 1, and
d
daIa > 0 ; (ii) for a > ba, ddaa = 0, ddasa < 0, and ddaIa < 0.
The next proposition considers the case when n increases by means of . Its formal proof follows
immediately from the characterization of the equilibrium necessary and su¢ cient conditions from
Barbos (2012), and is thus omitted. Instead, we will present its intuition in section 3.4. hs i, ,
s and I have the obvious denitions.
Proposition 11 Assume information arrives continuously. Then, there exists a unique symmetric
equilibrium simple strategy hs i, and a threshold b, such that: (i) for  < b, dd  = 0, s = 1, and
d
dI = 0; (ii) for  > b, dd  > 0, dds < 0, and ddI < 0.
Therefore, the inverted-U relationship between the measure of players in the game and the
equilibrium ex-ante investment expenditures that emerges when the measure of players increases
by means of an increase in a, does not do so when the increase is by means of . In particular, for
small values of , players do not react by decreasing the equilibrium delay when  increases.
We now return to the case where information arrives at discrete times. If n increases by means
of a, it can be shown that the equilibrium has the same properties as when information arrives
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continuously, only that a and Ia are step functions when a < ba. Proposition 12 presents the main
result of the paper when the increase in n is by means of . Its proof, as well as more precise
statements, with the exact conditions determining the equilibrium strategies and the cuto¤s, can
be found in appendix C1. The corollary is proved in appendix C2.
Proposition 12 There exists b 2 (m; M ) and an increasing sequence f0  b; 1; 2; :::g 
(m; M ), such that in equilibrium,
1. When  2 (m;b), players adopt hs i, with s = 1, and  a decreasing step function of .
2. When  2 (b; M ), players adopt either
(a) hs i, for  2 [k2N

[2k; 2k+1)
	
, and


s ; s

+

, for  2 [k2N

[2k+1; 2k+2)
	
, where
 = b + k, for  2 [2k; 2k+2), or
(b)


s ; s

+

, for  2 [k2N

[2k; 2k+1)
	
, and hs i, for  2 [k2N

[2k+1; 2k+2)
	
, where
 = b + (k   1) , for  2 [2k; 2k+2).
Corollary 13 (i) For  2 (m;b), I is an increasing step function of ; (ii) For  2 (b; M ),
d
dI < 0.
For low values of , players expect strictly positive equilibrium ex-ante payo¤s and invest with
probability s = 1 if a negative signal is not received by time . For these values, as  increases,
the MC curve shifts up, exceeding the MB earlier and inducing players to weakly decrease the
equilibrium delay . The step function  emerges because the discreteness of Z+ implies that
the equilibrium strategies will prescribe investment after a given waiting time for a range of values
of . Since for  2 (m;b), players undertake riskier investments as  increases, they increase the
expected ex-ante investment expenditures because, from an ex-ante point of view, the likelihood
that they invest is higher.
When  is su¢ ciently high, i.e., at b, condition (11) is satised with equality and the equilibrium
expected ex-ante payo¤ is zero. For  2 (b; M ), there is no equilibrium with players adopting hs i,
with s = 1. To see this, note that if such an equilibrium existed, as  increases above b, to continue
to expect non-negative ex-ante payo¤s, players would need to invest in safer projects. But if s = 1,
the MC would continue to shift up as  increases. Thus, the trade-o¤ between the MC and the
MB of waiting would be solved earlier, inducing players to actually invest in riskier projects.
Instead, for  2 (b; M ) players decrease s and invest later. For some values of  2 (b; M ),
all players that invest, do so after waiting the same time ; for the rest, there are two equilibrium
waiting times. The resulting equilibrium prole of waiting times is increasing in  for  > b, while
the ex-ante expected investment expenditures are decreasing.
The equilibrium strategy for  2 (b; M ) in case (a) of proposition 12.2 is presented in the
following gure. 0  b denotes the equilibrium waiting time at b. As  increases on [b; 1],
12
players adopt strategy hs0i, continuing to invest after waiting the same time as at  = b, but with
a decreasing probability. On [1; 2], players adopt strategy
D
s0 ; s

0+
E
; as  increases they lower
s0 and increase s

0+
. The upper bound of the interval, 2, is dened by s
2
0 = 0. On [2; 3],
players adopt strategy
D
s0+
E
, and as  increases, they decrease s0+ until  = 3, where they
start adopting strategy
D
s0+; s

0+2
E
.
To understand the intuition for the equilibrium strategy when   b, note rst that as 
increases on intervals [b; 1], [2; 3], [4; 5], etc., s decreases so as to keep the expected ex-ante
payo¤ at zero, since the waiting time is constant on these intervals. We will argue next that this
implies that for t in a neighborhood of , MChsi(t) decreases as  increases on these intervals.
This is in contrast to the nding derived from lemma 3, where s was constant as  increased.
For a xed value of , let s be the value that satises (11) with equality
p0

sa;
1
2
sa

  c p0 + (1  p0) e  = 0 (18)
Since  is strictly decreasing in both arguments, s is constant. Now, from (7), by straightforward
calculations, it follows that
@ ln hsi(t)
@ ln 
 1 (19)
for t 2 [   2 ;  + 2 ]. Thus, hsi is inelastic with respect to , for t in a neighborhood of .
Intuitively, if all players wait the same time  before investing, player i already assigns a high
probability to the event that investment is ongoing at ti + t, when t is close to , irrespective of
the value of . Therefore, an increase in  does not alter signicantly his strategic beliefs. On
the other hand, from (7), it also follows that the MChsi curve is unit elastic with respect to
s . Note now that as  increases, since s

   is constant, the absolute values of the percentage
changes in s and  must be equal. Therefore, if  increases by 1%, s

 decreases by 1%, while
(19) implies that hsi increases by less than 1%. It follows then that, as claimed, as  increases,
MChsi(t) = p0as

hsi (t) decreases for t 2 [  

2 ; 
 + 2 ].
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Now, as argued earlier, for  < b, as  increases, the MC shifts up and players wait less before
investing. At  = b, (11) is satised with equality, while by proposition 5, MChs0i(0   ) 
MB (0   ) and MB (0)  MChs0i(0), where, as dened previously, 0 = 
b. As  increases
above b, s0 decreases so as to hold the expected ex-ante payo¤ at zero and so, the MChs0i(t)
decreases for t 2 [0   2 ; 0 + 2 ]. Since  < 2 , MChs0i(0   ) and MChs0i(0) decrease. Let 1
be dened by
MChs10i (0) = MB (0) (20)
As  increases just above 1 to 1 + ", where " is arbitrarily small, MCDs1+"0 E (0) falls below
MB (0). So
D
s
1+"
0
E
is not an equilibrium strategy because it fails to satisfy (13); players would
have an incentive to deviate and invest after waiting 0 +  time units. However,
D
s
1+"
0+
E
is
also not an equilibrium. To understand this, note that if it was, since players would invest now
in safer projects, for the zero expected ex-ante payo¤ condition to continue to be satised, the
probability of investment should have an instant upward jump immediately above 1. This would
lower the expected ex-post payo¤ and o¤set the higher likelihood that the project is feasible. Thus,
s
1+"
0+
> s
1
0 . Now, by inspecting (7), it follows that hs+i () = hs i (), and thus that
MChs10i (0) = MC
D
s
1
0+
E (0) (21)
Then, (20), (21), and s1+"0+ > s
1
0 imply that
MCD
s
1+"
0+
E (0) > MB (0) (22)
Thus,
D
s
1+"
0+
E
is not an equilibrium strategy because it fails (12); players would deviate from the
prescribed equilibrium strategy of waiting 0 +  time units, and instead wait 0 time units.
The issue is resolved if the transition between the waiting times 0 and 0+ is smooth, in that
as  increases above 1, players decrease the probability of waiting 0 time units and increase the
probability of waiting 0 +  time units. Thus, as  increases on [1; 2], s

0 decreases and s

0+
increases such that players expect zero ex-ante payo¤s if investing after waiting either 0 or 0 + 
time units. After the transition is complete at 2, where 2 is dened by s
2
0 = 0, as  further
increases, all players that invest, do so after waiting 0 +  time units. Then the process repeats.
The case (b) from proposition 12.2 appears because it may happen that when condition (13)
binds for some value b and waiting time b, as  increases slightly, if the waiting time decreases to
b  and all players invest, the non-negative ex-ante payo¤ condition in (14) is no longer satised.
In this case, immediately above b, players employ a strategy 
s ; s. The analysis is similar
to the one from case (a).
The next corollary, whose proof is in appendix C3, states the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
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Corollary 14 For almost any  2 (m; M ), the equilibrium in proposition 12 is the unique equi-
librium in simple strategies.
3.4 Discussion
As explained in section 3.1, an increase in  leads each player to have a higher belief about the event
that investment is ongoing in the game at any time, thus increasing the MC of waiting. For low
levels of , when players expect strictly positive ex-ante payo¤s and thus invest with conditional
probability one, the upward shift of theMC curve induces players to invest earlier. For high values
of , the non-negativity constraint on the equilibrium expected ex-ante payo¤ binds and players
invest with a decreasing conditional probability. The e¤ect of the belief updating on the marginal
cost of waiting is of second order, and is compensated by the rst order e¤ect of the decrease in
equilibrium probability of investment. On net, the MC decreases for these higher values of ,
inducing players to invest later, thus further reducing investment. Therefore, for higher values of
, when  increases, players invest with a decreasing probability and wait longer.
The inverted-U shaped relationship between  and I does not emerge when information arrives
continuously because the value of the MC at the equilibrium waiting time does not increase when
 increases. To understand why, recall from the discussion motivating the results in Proposition
12 that hsi(t) is inelastic with respect to  in the neighborhood around 
. In particular, as
 approaches 0, according to the equilibrium strategies of the other players, investment is almost
surely ongoing in the game at times around the equilibrium waiting time . Thus, that belief is
not altered in a measurably meaningful way between    and  + . In the limit as  ! 0, while
the MChsi(t) increases in  for all t 6= , MChsi() stays constant because at ti +  player
i knows for sure that investment is ongoing in the game irrespective of the value of . Thus, the
MC curve crosses the MB curve at the same point as  increases for  < b, and so players do not
change their waiting time. For  > b, as  increases, s must decrease to satisfy the zero prot
condition. This shifts down the MC curve everywhere and induces players to invest later.15
4 Conclusion
Previous literature found that an increase in the number of players in a preemption game induces
them to undertake riskier actions as long as they expect non-negative payo¤s from doing so. For
instance, when the number of rms in an industry increases, they become more agressive in their
innovative activities. This is no longer the case if the increase in the number of players is purely on
an extensive margin, in that it leads to an increase in the amount of time it takes for all players to
learn of an investment opportunity. For instance, if the increase in the number of rms is associated
15Note that when the increase in n is by means of an increase in a, the e¤ect on the MC is of the rst order and
thus players do wait less for the lower values of a. For higher values, the e¤ects of the increase in a and decrease in
sa perfectly compensate each other and the equilibrium waiting time stays constant.
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with a larger technological dispersion in the industry that expands the amount of time it takes for
all rms to make a technological breakthrough, the positive relationship between competition and
innovation no longer holds. In this paper we show that the positive relationship reemerges if
players take investment decisions at discrete times either because the information arrives discretely
or because they are constrained to do so.
Appendix
Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 3
First, we present a result that elicits hs i(tjti).
Lemma 15 Consider a strategy prole under which each player employs the strategy hs i. Then,
the expected measure of players who have invested before player i at moment ti + t, with t  0 is
hs i(tjti) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0, for t 2 [0;max(0;    )]
sa
h
(t +)2
2
i
, for t 2 (max(0;    );  ]
sa
h

2 + (t  )  (t )
2
2
i
, for t 2 ( ;  + ]
sa, for t >  + 
(23)
Proof. This follows from (3) and (4) by direct computation. A detailed argument is presented in
Barbos (2012). 
To show the result in lemma 3, it is then su¢ cient then to employ (6) to compute MChs i(t).
Thus, for t 2 Z+ \ [max(0;    );  + ], we have:
hs i(t+ jti)  hs i(tjti) =
=
8<: sa
h
(t+ +)2
2
i
  sa
h
(t +)2
2
i
, for t 2 [max(0;    );    ]
sa
h

2 + (t+    )  (t+ )
2
2
i
  sa
h

2 + (t  )  (t )
2
2
i
, for t 2 [ ;  + ]
=
8<: sa
h
(t+ +)2
2
i
  sa
h
(t +)2
2
i
, for t 2 [max(0;    );  ]
sa
h

2 + (t+    )  (t+ )
2
2
i
  sa
h

2 + (t  )  (t )
2
2
i
, for t 2 [ ;  + ]
=
(
sa



   (   t) + 2

, for t 2 [max (0;    ) ; )
sa



   (t  )  2

, for t 2 [ ;  + ]
The result from the lemma 3 follows then immediately. Note that in the above, we did not
compute hs i(t + jti)   hs i(tjti) for t =2 Z+. Also, we did not compute the MC for t =2
(max(0;    );  + ) since, as it will become clear shortly, it is never a best response for a player
to invest at those times under a symmetric strategy prole hs i. 
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Appendix B1. Proof of Proposition 5
We will show rst that the conditions in the proposition are su¢ cient for hs i to be a symmetric
equilibrium strategy of the game. Assume all other players, but player i play strategy hs i that
satises (11)-(14). We will show that in that case it is is best response to play the same strategy.
First, note that if  > , then hs i(tjti) = 0 for t 2 [0;    ] so it is not is best response to invest
before ti +    . Also, by (14), clearly it is not his best response to invest after ti +  + . Denote
by
	hs i(t)  p0

A (sa)  hs i(tjti)
  c p0 + (1  p0) e t , for t  0. (24)
Note that when t 2 Z+, 	hs i(t) is player is expected ex-ante payo¤ from investing at ti + t.
However, note that we dene 	hs i(t) for all values of t  0 so as to be able to employ standard
calculus methods. To prove the result it is enough to show that 	hs i() is maximized at t = 
in the set [max(0;    );  + ] \ Z+. From (23) and (24), it follows that when t <  , we have
	00hs i(t) =  p000hs i(tjti) 2c (1  p0) e t =  p0a s  2c (1  p0) e t < 0. On the other hand,
for t 2 [ ;  + ], we have 	000hs i(t) = 3c (1  p0) e t > 0.
Now rst, the condition p0

A (sa)  12sa
   c p0 + (1  p0) e t  0 from the text of
the proposition, ensures that 	hs i()  0 since hs i( jti) = 12sa. Thus, i has a non-negative
expected ex-ante payo¤ from pursuing strategy hs i. Second, from (24) it follows that
	hs i()  	hs i(   ),
,  p0hs i( jti)  c (1  p0) e    p0hs i(   jti)  c (1  p0) e ( )
, p0

hs i( jti)  hs i(   jti)
  c (1  p0) he ( )   e i
, MChs i(   ) MB(   )
which is condition (12) from the text of the proposition. Therefore, since 	hs i is concave for
t   , and 	hs i()  	hs i(   ), it must be that it is increasing for all t     . Thus,
	hs i(t)  	hs i() for t   .
On the other hand, it is straightforward to see that
	hs i()  	hs i( + ),MB() MChs i()
which is condition (13) from the text of the proposition. Since 	000hs i(t) > 0, it follows that once
	hs i () is convex, it will be convex for all higher values of t. Since 	hs i()  	hs i( + ), 	hs i
is decreasing in between  and  + . But, 	hs i can start increasing only after it becomes convex.
So after it starts increasing, it will increase forever. Since (14), for the case when s < 1, and
assumption 1, for the case when s = 1, ensure that 	hs i( + )  0, it means that 	hs i(t)  0
for t   + . Therefore, as desired, 	hs i()  	hs i(t) for all 0  t   + . This completes the
proof of su¢ ciency in the proposition.
The necessity of (11)-(14) is straightforward. When s < 1, (11) is necessary to be satised
17
with equality for players to be willing to mix. (13) and (12) are necessary as otherwise players
would be better o¤ waiting     or  +  time units. (14) is necessary because otherwise players
deviate and invest after all uncertainty is removed. This completes the proof of proposition 5. 
Appendix B2. Proof of Corollary 7
First, we argue that for a xed value of s there can be at most one value of  satisfying (12) and
(13). To see this, we rewrite (12) and (13) using lemma 3 as
p0as
1


   
2

 c (1  p0)

1  e 

e ( ) (25)
c (1  p0)
h
1  e 
i
e   p0as 1


   
2

(26)
which since the left hand side of (25) equals the right hand side of (26) imply
e   p0as
c (1  p0) (1  e )
1


   
2

 e e )
   ln

p0as
c (1  p0) (1  e )

   
2
2

   +  )
 2

  1

ln

p0as
c (1  p0) (1  e )

   
2
2

;  1

ln

p0as
c (1  p0) (1  e )

   
2
2

+ 

(27)
Note that (27) pins down a unique value for  for a given value of s , except if
  1

ln

p0as
c (1  p0) (1  e )

   
2
2

2 Z+ (28)
The set of values of  for which (28) is satised is countable. (27) also implies that for all values of
, except a countable subset, there is at most one symmetric equilibrium in simple strategies hs i
with s = 1.
Next, we argue that for all values of , except a countable subset, there is a unique equilibrium
in simple strategies hs i. Assume by contradiction that there are two such equilibria hs i and hs0 i.
If  =  0, then from (11) it follows that s = s0 because A is strictly decreasing in both arguments
and thus the two strategies would be identical. If  >  0 then from (27) it must be that s < s0 .
However, from (24) it is clear that when  >  0 and s < s0 , we have 	hs i() > 	hs0 i(
0). This
implies that 	hs i() > 0, and thus that s = 1. This is inconsistent with s < s
0
 . Thus, indeed
there is at most one symmetric equilibrium in simple strategies hs i. 
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Appendix B3. Proof of Proposition 8
Showing the necessity of the conditions (15)-(17) is straightforward. We will show next their
su¢ ciency. Assume all other players, but player i, adopt strategy hs ; s+i with s+ > 0. Then,
as in (24), denote by
	hs ;s+i(t)  p0

A ((s + s+) a)  hs ;s+i(tjti)
  c p0 + (1  p0) e t , for t  0 (29)
and note that when t 2 Z+, 	hs i(t) is is expected ex-ante payo¤ if it invests at time ti + t. We
will show that 	00hs ;s+i(t) < 0 for t <  and 	
000
hs ;s+i(t) > 0 for t >  +  so that the argument
from the proof of proposition 5 from appendix B1 will go through in this case as well with a slight
modication. First, by (9), it follows that
	hs ;s+i(t) = p0

A ((s + s+) a)  hs i(tjti)  hs+i(tjti)
  c p0 + (1  p0) e t
Using lemma 15, we have then that
	00hs ;s+i(t) =
(
 p0a (s + s+) 1   2c (1  p0) e t, for t < 
p0as
1
   p0as+ 1   2c (1  p0) e t, for  < t <  + 
(30)
On the other hand,
	000hs ;s+i(t) = 
3c (1  p0) e t, for all t  max(0;    )
Note that 	00hs i;(+)(t) < 0 for t <  and 	
000
hs i;(+)(t) > 0 for t >  + . Moreover, it is
straightforward to see that
lim
t!(+) 
	00hs ;s+i(t) = p0a (s   as+)
1

  2c (1  p0) e (+)
< lim
t!(+)+
	00hs ;s+i(t) = p0a (s + s+)
1

  2c (1  p0) e (+)
Finally, the condition from (16) in the text of the proposition 8 is equivalent to
	hs ;s+i() = 	hs ;s+i( + ) (31)
while (17) implies
	hs ;s+i( +  + ) < 0
We will argue now that 	hs ;s+i()  	hs ;s+i(t) for all t 2 Z+. We consider two cases.
Case 1: s  s+. In this case, from (30) it follows that 	00hs ;s+i(t) < 0 for t 2 ( ;  + ).
Therefore the function 	hs ;s+i is concave for t < +. It is clear then that this and 	hs ;s+i() =
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	hs ;s+i( + ) imply that 	
0
hs ;s+i() > 0 and 	
0
hs ;s+i( + ) < 0.
16 Since 	000hs ;s+i(t) > 0 for
t > + and 	hs ;s+i(++) < 0, an argument similar to the one from the proof of proposition
5 shows the result.
Case 2: s > s+. In this case, 	000hs ;s+i(t) > 0 for t   together with the facts that
lim
t!(+) 
	00hs ;s+i(t) < limt!(+)+
	00hs ;s+i(t) implies that once 	hs ;s+i is convex, it will be convex
for all higher values. If 	hs ;s+i were increasing at  + , then it should already be convex there
and thus it would be increasing for all values above  + . But this contradicts the fact that
	hs ;s+i()  0 > 	hs ;s+i( +  + ). Therefore, 	0hs ;s+i( + ) < 0. Also, 	0hs ;s+i() >
0 because otherwise, in order for 	hs ;s+i to be decreasing at  + , it should have increased
somewhere between  and  + , which would imply that 	hs ;s+i was convex at that point and
therefore convex and increasing from that point to  + . But this would contradict the fact that
	hs ;s+i should be decreasing at  + . The rest of the argument goes as in the previous case. 
Appendix B4. Proof of Corollary 9
We show rst the uniqueness of the strategy hs ; s+i satisfying (15)-(17) for a xed value of  .
Note rst that lemma 15 implies hs+i( jti) = s+a ( )
2
2 , hs i( + jti) = sa


2 +    
2
2

,
hs i( jti) = sa2 and hs+i( + jti) = s+a2 . Using these in (29) it follows that
	hs ;s+i() = p0A ((s + s+) a)  p0a
"
s

2
+ s+
(   )2
2
#
  c p0 + (1  p0) e   (32)
	hs ;s+i( + ) = (33)
= p0A ((s + s+) a)  p0a

s


2
+    
2
2

+ s+

2

  c
h
p0 + (1  p0) e (+)
i
Since 	hs ;s+i() = 	hs ;s+i( + ), by subtracting the two equations we rewrite (16) as
p0a (s + s+)

   
2
2

= c (1  p0)

1  e 

e  (34)
Now, when 	hs ;s+i() > 0, it must be that s +s+ = 1. From (34) this uniquely determines
the value of  . However, unless   1 ln

p0a
c(1 p0)[1 e ]

   22

2 Z+, such an equilibrium does
not exist. Therefore, a symmetric equilibrium in strategies hs ; s+i with s +s+ = 1 exists only
for a countable set of values of .
On the other hand, when s + s+ < 1, (34) gives s + s+ for any given value of  .
16By straightforward calculations it follows that 	 is di¤erentiable at both  and  + .
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	hs ;s+i() = 0, (32) can be rewritten as
p0A ((s + s+) a)  p0a

(s + s+)

2
  s+

   
2
2

  c p0 + (1  p0) e   = 0 (35)
Since s + s+ is determined by the value of  , (35) determines s+ uniquely as a function of  ,
and therefore s is determined as well. Therefore, for any  2 Z+, there exists at most one pair
of s and s+ satisfying (15)-(17). 
Appendix C1. Proof of Proposition 12
We will show that for any value of  2 [m; M ], where m and M are dened in assumption 1
there exists a symmetric equilibrium in simple strategies. Note rst that
  1

ln

p0a
c (1  p0) (1  e )

   
2
2

> 0,
p0a

   
2
2

< c (1  p0)

1  e 

,  < M
It follows that there always exists at least one value of  satisfying (27) for s = 1. Let e () to be
the value satisfying (27) for s = 1 when   1 ln

p0a
c(1 p0)(1 e )

   22

=2 Z+, and let e () be
the upper bound of the interval otherwise. Formally,
e ()    1

ln

p0a
c (1  p0) (1  e )

   
2
2

;  1

ln

p0a
c (1  p0) (1  e )

   
2
2

+ 

\Z+
The resulting e () is a decreasing step function of . As  increases, the two bounds decrease,
and for values of  for which   1 ln

p0a
c(1 p0)(1 e )

   22

2 Z+, the value of e () has a
downward jump. In between these values, e () is constant.
Denition 16 Let
Dese()E be the simple strategy with waiting time e () and probability of invest-
ment ese() = 1.
We have two cases to consider depending on the sign of	Desme(m)E(e (m)). If	Desme(m)E(e (m)) <
0, m is too high for players to expect non-negative ex-ante payo¤s if they all invest in the project.
In this case, let b  m.
If 	Desme(m)E(e (m)) > 0, let b be the maximum value of  for which the following are satised
	Dese()E(e ())  0 (36)
MCDese()E(e ()  )  MB (e ()  ) (37)
MB (e ())  MCDese()E(e ()) (38)
21
First, note that (37) and (38) can be rewritten as in (27), with ese() = 1. Thus, they will
always be satised for some e (). On the other hand, from (24) it follows that 	Dese()E(e ())
is decreasing in  because A0() < 0, Dese()E(e ()) = 12a, and e () is weakly decreasing in .
However, since e () is not continuous, 	Dese()E(e ()) is not continuous at the values of  for whiche () has the downward jump. The points of discontinuity of e () occur at values of  for which
MCDese()E(e () ) = MB (e ()  ). This is intuitive since in between two points of discontinuity
of e (), MCDese()E(e ()   ) and MCDese()E(e ()) both increase as  increases. Therefore, b is
dened either by
(i) 	Desbe(b)E(e (b)) = 0, or by (39)
(ii) MCDesbe(b)E(e (b)  ) = MB (e (b)  ) , 	Desbe(b)E(e (b))  0, and lim!b+	Dese()E(e ()) < 0
(40)
As we will argue shortly, case (i) will correspond to case (a) in the text of proposition 12(2 ) because
just above b players will start investing at e (b) with a decreasing probability. Case (ii), which
occurs when 	hesi(e ()) falls below 0 at a point of discontinuity of e (), will correspond to case
(b). Note also that b > m because 	Dese()E(e ()) is decreasing in . Then for any  2 [m;b], let
  e () and hs i  Dese()E and note that all conditions of proposition 5 are satised, that  is
decreasing in , and that s = 1.
Lemma 17 For any  > b there is no symmetric equilibrium in simple strategies hs i with s = 1.
Proof. Consider rst case (i) from (39). Let 0  e (b) and denote by 1 the minimal value of  for
which 0 is an equilibrium waiting time. Note that at 1, players have just switched from
Des0+E
to hes0i. Therefore, MCDes10+E(0) = MB (0). Since the MC is increasing in  on
h

1
;bi,
MCDes0+E(0) increases, exceeding MB (0). Thus,
Des0+E is not an equilibrium strategy for
 2
h

1
;bi. Instead, players adopt strategy hes0i.
At b, we have 	Desb0E(0) = 0. Above b, if all players were to adopt hes0i, 	hes0i(0) < 0
and players would expect negative ex-ante payo¤s from hes0i. To avoid this, if players were to
continue to invest with probability 1, they must switch immediately to waiting for more than 0
units of time, so as to invest in safer projects. But switching to investing at 0 +  is not a
feasible equilibrium strategy because MCDes0+E(0) > MB (0), so condition (12) would not be
satised. Also, since when es0+k = es0+ = 1, we have that for any k  1, MCDes0+kE(0 +
k   ) = MCDes0+E(0) = p0a

   22

, and MB (0) > MB (0 + k   ), it follows that
MCDes0+kE(0 + k   ) > MB (0 + k   ). Thus, no waiting time higher than 0 is feasible in
22
an equilibrium with es0+k = 1.
On the other hand, if b is dened by case (ii) in (40), at b we have MCDesb0E(0   ) =
MB (0   ). By the same argument as above, it follows then that when es0+k = 1, we have
MCDes0+kE(0 + k   ) > MB (0 + k   ) for all k  1, so no equilibrium in which players
invest with probability 1 exists. 
Since by corollary 9, it is also the case that, generically, no symmetric equilibrium in simple
strategies


s ; s

+

with s + s

+ = 1 exists, the equilibrium probability of investment must be
lower than 1 for  > b.
Denition 18 For a xed value of  , let hs i be the simple strategy with waiting time  and with
s dened implicitly by the equation 	hsi() = 0.
Lemma 19 MChsi() and MChsi(   ) are decreasing in .
Proof. We can rewrite 	hsi() = 0 as p0
 
A (as)  12as
   c p0 + (1  p0) e   = 0. Since
A0 < 0, the equation p0
 
A (ax)  12ax
   c p0 + (1  p0) e   = 0 has a unique solution x0 for
a xed  . Therefore, s = x0 for all . Now, MChsi() = MChsi(   ) = p0as



   22

=
p0a
x0


   22

, which is decreasing in  for  > . 
We identify next one symmetric equilibrium simple strategy for each value of  with  > b.
Corollary 14 will argue that generically each of these equilibria is unique in the set of simple
strategies for that particular value of .
We consider rst case (i) from (39) and let again 0  e (b). Without loss of generality, we
assume thatMB (0) < MCDesb0E(0). Otherwise, the analysis is the same as in case (ii) that will be
discussed below. Note now that MCDesb0E(0) = MCDsb0E(0) because at b, we have esb0 = sb0 = 1.
Since by lemma 19, MChsi() and MChsi(   ) are decreasing in , dene 1 to be such that
MChs10i(0) = MB(0). If no such value exists, then the simple strategy we will dene next for
 2 (b; 1) will be the equilibrium strategy for all values of  > b. Thus, for  2 (b; 1), dene
hs i by letting   0 and s  s0 . This strategy satises all conditions of proposition 5. (11)
is satised by the denition of s0 . (12) is satised because MChsi(0   ) = MChsi(0   ) <
MCD
sb0
E(0   )  MB (0   ). (13) is satised because MChes0i(0) is decreasing in  and
 < 1. Finally, (14) is satised because  (s

a; s

a) =  (ab; ab) < c because s0 = b, as
shown in the proof of lemma 19.
As  increases above 1, a prole in which all players adopt the strategy hs i that was dened
on (b; 1) is no longer an equilibrium because MChs10i(0) > MB(0). Moreover, immediately
above 1, strategy
D
s0+
E
also does not constitute an equilibrium. In other words, it is not an
equilibrium for all players that invest to do so after waiting for a time 0+ . To see this, note rst
23
that MChs10i(0) = p0as
1
0

   221

and MCD
s
1
0+
E(0) = p0as10+

   221

. Now, given the
denition of s0+, it must be that s
1
0+
> s
1
0 . Intuitively, if at 1 players were to invest after
waiting for 0 + , since they would invest in safer projects, in order for the zero prot condition
to be satised, the mixing probability should have an upward jump relative to s10 . But then,
MCD
s
1
0+
E(0) = p0as10+

   
2
21

> p0as
1
0

   
2
21

= MChs10i(0) = MB(0)
Therefore,MCD
s
1
0+
E(0) > MB(0), which contradicts (12) from proposition 5. Let 2 be dened
by MCD
s
2
0+
E(0) = MB(0). Since MCDs0+E(0) is decreasing in , we have 2 > 1 and
MCD
s0+
E(0) > MB(0) for all  2 [1; 2). Therefore, strategy Ds0+E does not constitute an
equilibrium for any  2 [1; 2). By an identical argument, it follows that no other simple strategyD
s0+k
E
with k  1 is an equilibrium for  2 [1; 2) since
MCD
s0+k
E(0 + k   ) MCDs0+E(0) > MB(0) MB(0 + k   )
where the rst inequality comes from the fact that s0+k  s

0+
.
Instead, for  2 [1; 2), there is an symmetric equilibrium in which players adopt strategyD
s0 ; s

0+
E
, with s0 + s

0+
< 1, satisfying the conditions of proposition 8.
Lemma 20 For  2 [1; 2) there exists a simple strategy
D
s0 ; s

0+
E
satisfying (15)-(17).
Proof. As in (34), condition (16) can be rewritten as
p0a

s0 + s

0+

   
2
2

= c (1  p0)

1  e 

e 0 ) (41)
s0 + s

0+
= L
2
2    (42)
where L  c(1 p0)(1 e
 )e 0
p0a
. On the other hand, condition (33) with 	D
s0 ;s

0+
E(0) = 0 is
p0A

s0 + s

0+

a

  p0a

s0 + s

0+
 
2
+ s0

   
2
2

  c
h
p0 + (1  p0) e (0+)
i
= 0
(43)
Substituting s0 + s

0+
from (42), we obtain
p0A

aL
22
2   

  p0a

L
2
2    + s

0

   
2
2

  c
h
p0 + (1  p0) e (0+)
i
= 0
This equation denes s0 as an implicit function of . Using the implicit function theorem, it
follows that the resulting s0 is decreasing in .
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We will argue next that s0 2 (0; 1) for  2 [1; 2), so that s0 is a well dened probability. Note
that at 1, (41) and (43) are satised for s
1
0 = s
1
0 and s
1
0+
= 0, while at 2, they are satised
for s20 = 0 and s
2
0+
= s
2
0+
. By corollary (9), these are the unique equilibrium strategiesD
s0 ; s

0+
E
at those values of . Thus, s0 decreases on (1; 2) from s
1
0 to 0. Therefore, as
claimed, s0 2 [0; 1).
From (42) it also follows that s0 + s

0+
is decreasing in . Moreover, s10 > s
2
0+
. To see this,
note that they solve the equations
MChs10i(0) = MB(0)) p0as
1
0

   
2
21

= MB(0)
MCD
s
2
0+
E(0) = MB(0)) p0as20+

   
2
22

= MB(0)
Therefore, s10

   221

= s
2
0+

   222

, which since 2 > 1 implies s
1
0 > s
2
0+
. Since s10 +
s
1
0+
= s
1
0 , s
2
0 + s
2
0+
= s
2
0+
, and s0 + s

0+
is decreasing in , it follows that s0 + s

0+
2h
s
2
0+
; s
1
0
i
 (0; 1) for  2 [1; 2).
We will show next that s0+ 2 (0; 1). Since s
1
0+
= 0 and s20+ = s
2
0+
2 (0; 1), it would be
enough to show that s0+ is increasing in . Now, from (32) with 	
D
s0 ;s

0+
E(0 + ) = 0 and
substituting s0 + s

0+
from (42) we have
p0A

aL
22
2   

  p0a

L
2
2      s

0+

   
2
2

  c p0 + (1  p0) e 0 = 0 (44)
Because @@
h
A

aL 2
2
2 
i
< 0 and the derivative of the left hand side of (44) with respect to s0+
is positive, using the implicit function theorem, to show that s0+ is increasing in  it is enough
to show that
@
@

L
2
2      s

0+

   
2
2

> 0, L2
2   2
(2   )2   s

0+
2
22
> 0 (45)
Now note from (42), s0 > 0 implies that
s0+ < L
2
2    (46)
Substituting (46) into (45), we have
L
22   2
(2   )2   s

0+
2
22
> L
22   2
(2   )2   L
2
2   
2
22
(47)
so using that L > 0 and 2    > 0, it follows that it is enough to show that
   
2     
2
22
> 0, H()  23   22   22 + 3 > 0
25
We have H 0()  62   4   22 and H 00()  12   4. Since H 00() > 0 for  >  and
H 0() = 0, it follows that H 0()  0 for  > . Also, H(2) = 53 > 0. Therefore, H() > 0 for
 > 2, i.e., for  2  0; 2. Therefore, s0+ is well dened.
Finally, from (42) it also follows that

s0 + s

0+

 = L 2
2
2  , which is increasing in . There-
fore,

s0 + s

0+

 > s
1
01 = b. Thus, condition (17) of the proposition 8 is also satised. This
completes the proof of lemma 20. 
Thus, as  increases above 1, players gradually shift the weight of the mixing probabilities from
waiting for 0 towards waiting for 0+, until at 2 where players no longer invest after waiting for
0. Using the same arguments as before, it can be shown that above 2, the symmetric equilibrium
strategy is hs i, with  = 0 +  and s = s0+. As shown in lemma 19, MCDs0+E(0 + )
and MCD
s0+
E(0 + 2) decrease in  until 3 where MCDs30+E(0 + ) = MB(0 + ), and the
players start adopting
D
s0+; s

0+2
E
, with mixing probabilities dened in a similar manner as forD
s0 ; s

0+
E
. Then, as  increases, the process repeats.
The argument for the case (b) of proposition 8(2) and 0    is sustainable in a mixed strategy
equilibrium is similar to the one above. This completes the proof of proposition 12. 
Appendix C2. Proof of Corollary 13
Part (i) of the corollary follows immediately from lemma 4 and the fact that when  2 (m;b), the
equilibrium strategy hs i has s = 1 and  a decreasing step function.
For part (ii), note from lemma 4 that it is su¢ cient to show that @@s

 < 0 when players adopt
hs i and that @@

s + e s+

< 0 when players adopt


s ; s

+

. The rst condition follows
immediately from the proof of proposition 12. From (42), we have that s + s

+ = L
2
2  where L
does not depend on . Clearly, @@

s + s

+

< 0, and since from the proof of proposition 12 we
know that @@s

+ > 0 and
@
@s

 , we have that @@s

 <   @@s+ < 0. But then @@s <  e  @@s+,
so @@

s + e s+

< 0. This completes the proof of the corollary. 
Appendix C3. Proof of Corollary 14
First, by corollary 7, for all values of  2 (m;b), but a countable subset, there is no other symmetric
equilibrium simple strategy hs i. Also, by corollary 9(ii), there is no symmetric equilibrium simple
strategy


s ; s

+

with s + s

+ = 1. It remains to show that there is no symmetric equilibrium
simple strategy


s ; s

+

with s + s

+ < 1. Assume by contradiction that such a strategy

s ; s

+

exists for some  2 (m; M ). In order for s + s+ < 1, it must be that players
expect zero ex-ante payo¤s in this equilibrium. Moreover, since players expect strictly positive
ex-ante payo¤s while they all invest after waiting for time e (), it must be that  < e () because
26
otherwise s + s

+ < 1 would not be possible. Now, note that the denition of e () implies
c (1  p0)

1  e 

e e()e  p0a

   
2
2

 c (1  p0)

1  e 

e e()
Now, from (34) it follows that
p0a
 
s + s

+

   
2
2

= c (1  p0)

1  e 

e 
 c (1  p0)

1  e 

e e()e  p0a

   
2
2

where the rst inequality follows from   e ()  . This contradicts s + s+ < 1.
We consider next the case (a) from proposition 12.2. First, we show that the equilibrium in
proposition 12.2 is unique on (b; 1). By corollary 7 there can be no other symmetric equilibrium
strategy hs i. Assume by contradiction that there exists a symmetric equilibrium simple strategy

s ; s

+

. Since the strategy hs0i is an equilibrium on (b; 1), it follows by corollary 9(i) that it
must be that  6= 0.
Assume rst that  < 0. Then it must be that
p0a
 
s + s

+

   
2
2

 c (1  p0)

1  e 

e 0e  p0as0

   
2
2

where the rst inequality follows from (34) and the fact that   0   , while the second from
MB (0   ) MChs0i(0   ). Therefore, s

 + s

+ > s

0 . But then from (33) we have
	hs ;s+i( + ) = p0A
  
s + s

+

a
  p0a  s + s+ 2 + s

   
2
2

  c
h
p0 + (1  p0) e (+)
i
< p0A
 
s0a
  p0a hs0 2i  c p0 + (1  p0) e 0 = 	hs0i(0) = 0
where the inequality follows from s + s

+ > s

0 , A
0 < 0, s > 0 and  +   0. Therefore,
	hs ;s+i( + ) < 0, which provides the contradiction.
Assume now that  > 0. Then,
p0a
 
s + s

+

   
2
2

= c (1  p0)

1  e 

e 
< c (1  p0)

1  e 

e 0  p0as0

   
2
2

where the equality follows from (34), and the last inequality from MChs0i(0)  MB (0). It
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follows thus that s + s

+  s0 . Now, from (32) and (29) we have
	hs ;s+i() = p0A
  
s + s

+

a
  p0a  s + s+ 2   s+

   
2
2

  c p0 + (1  p0) e  
> p0A
 
s0a
  p0a hs0 2i  c p0 + (1  p0) e 0 = 	hs0i(0) = 0
because s + s

+  s0 , A0 < 0, s+ > 0 and  > 0. Therefore, 	hs ;s+i() > 0, which is a
contradiction. This completes the proof of the uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium in simple
strategies on (b; 1).
Next, we argue that
D
s0 ; s

0+
E
dened in lemma 20 is the unique simple strategy symmetric
equilibrium for  2 (1; 2). First, as argued above, there is no equilibrium simple strategy hs i on
(1; 2). Assume by contradiction that there is some other equilibrium simple strategy


s ; s

+

.
By corollary 9, it must be that  6= 0 and that s + s+ < 1.
Assume rst that  < 0. Then, (34) applied to both
D
s0 ; s

0+
E
and


s ; s

+

implies
s0 + s

0+
< s + s

+ (48)
On the other hand, using (33), 	hs ;s+i( + ) = 0 and 	
D
s0 ;s

0+
E(0 + ) = 0 imply
p0A
  
s + s

+

a

= p0a
 
s + s

+
 
2
+ s

   
2
2

+ c
h
p0 + (1  p0) e (+)
i
p0A

s0 + s

0+

a

= p0a

s0 + s

0+
 
2
+ s0

   
2
2

+ c
h
p0 + (1  p0) e (0+)
i
Using (51) and A0 < 0, these imply
p0as



   
2
2

 p0a
h
s0 + s

0+
  s   s+
 
2
i
+c (1  p0) e 
 
e 0   e +p0as0    22

(49)
Now, note that, by the denition of 1, from (41) and the fact that s
1
0+
= 0, we have
p0as
1
0

   
2
21

= c (1  p0)

1  e 

e 0 (50)
Writing (49) for  = 1, and using (50) to substitute p0as
1
0

   221

, we have
as
1


   
2
21

 p0a
h
s
1
0 + s
1
0+
  s1   s1+
 1
2
i
+ c (1  p0)
h
e 0   e e 
i
But since   0   , we have e 0   e e   0, and thus s1 < 0. Since s is decreasing in 
on (1; 2), it follows that s

 < 0 for all  2 (1; 2). This provides the desired contradiction.
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Assume now that  > 0. Then, (34) applied to
D
s0 ; s

0+
E
and


s ; s

+

implies
s0 + s

0+
> s + s

+ (51)
Using (32) to write 	hs ;s+i() = 0 and 	
D
s0 ;s

0+
E(0) = 0, and then using (51) and A0 < 0, we
have
p0as

+

   
2
2

 p0a
h
s + s

+   s0   s0+
 
2
i
+c (1  p0)
 
e    e 0+p0as0+    22

(52)
By the denition of 2, from (41) and the fact that s
2
0 = 0, we have
p0as
2
0+

   
2
22

= c (1  p0)

1  e 

e 0 (53)
Writing (52) for  = 2, and using (53) to substitute p0as
2
0+

   222

, we have
as
2
+

   
2
22

 p0a
h
s
2
 + s
2
+   s20   s20+
 2
2
i
+ c (1  p0)
h
e    e (0+)
i
From (51) and   0 + , this implies that s2+ < 0. Since s+ is increasing in  on (1; 2), it
follows that s+ < 0 for all  2 (1; 2). This provides the contradiction and completes the proof
of the uniqueness of the equilibrium in simple strategies on (1; 2).
The argument of the uniqueness of the equilibrium in simple strategies for  2 (2k; 2k+1)
with k 2 N is identical with the argument presented above for  2 (b; 1), while the argument for
 2 (2k+1; 2k+2) is identical to the one presented for  2 (1; 2). The analysis for the case (b) of
proposition 12.2 is similar. This completes the proof of corollary 14. 
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